This paper examines the country-level dynamics of long-run growth in Africa between 1975 and 2005. We are primarily interested in examining how growth has affected mobility and the distribution of income among countries. We analyze changes in the cross-country income structure and convergence. We also look for evidence of the formation of country groups or "clubs". Finally, we use a novel method of breaking up the growth histories of African economies into medium term spells of growth accelerations and declines to see if a group of African "leopards" -the regional equivalent of Asia's "tigers" -is beginning to emerge.
Introduction
After stagnating for much of its post-colonial history, economic performance in Sub-Saharan Africa (Africa) has markedly improved. Since 1995, average economic growth has been close to 5 percent per a year. Countries with at least 4 percent GDP growth now constitute about 70 percent of the region's total population and 80 percent of its GDP. Per capita income grew by 1.6 percent a year in the late 1990s and by 2 to 3 percent in each year since 2000.
Recent popular and academic writing has suggested that Africa may be at a turning point in its long economic decline (see for example Commission for Africa 2005; Ndulu et al. 2007 ). But, predictions of Africa's imminent economic recovery or demise have proved wrong on numerous occasions in the past 40 years. Growth in Africa since 1975 has been lower and more volatile than in any other region of the world -developed or developing (table 1) . And, unlike East and (more recently) South Asia it has had few regional "champions" to serve as models of successful, rapidly growing economies. Using the most recent purchasing power parity (PPP) data for 44 sub-Saharan African countries, this paper examines country-level dynamics of long-run growth in Africa between 1975 and . The next section describes our data and the characteristics of Africa's long-run growth. Here we confirm previous findings that the 2 Botswana and Mauritius are notable exceptions to this statement, a theme to which we shall return below. major characteristics of growth in Africa are its low long run trend and its extreme volatility at the country level. We find no persuasive evidence of growth persistence within countries and only weak evidence of persistence at the regional level since 1990.
Section 3 examines how the growth recovery has affected the distribution of income among countries in the region. We describe the country level distribution of income in Africa and test for convergence in per capita income levels between richer and poorer countries. We find no evidence that poorer countries in Africa are converging to the income levels of their richer neighbors. We find persuasive evidence of inertia in per capita incomes for economies in Africa. Where countries began in terms of relative income in 1975 is an excellent predictor of where they ended up in 2005. Because the rich economies are growing faster than their poorer neighbors we also find that the intercountry distribution of income has become less equal over time.
The fourth section of the paper presents our hunt for the leopards. One indication that Africa has indeed reached a turning point, would be evidence that a group of African economies with high and accelerating long run growth -"leopards", the regional equivalent of Asia's "tigers" -is beginning to emerge. We first identify four groups of countries according to their income levels and growth experiences, and we look for some common characteristics that are associated with these groups. Two distinct and stable income groups or "clubs", rich and poor, are identifiable in the data. Our most striking finding is that transitions from low income to higher income levels have been rare in the last 30 years. Only 2 countries, both oil exporters, made the transition. We then use the approach to growth accelerations and decelerations developed by Arbache and Page (2007) to see if a subset of countries with a high frequency of rapid, growth accelerations emerges during [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Based on our results for income transitions, growth thresholds, and growth accelerations we identify six economies that show the potential to be Africa's growth leaders. Section 6 concludes.
Chaos without Change: Africa's Long Run Growth 1975-2005
This section describes long run trends in per capita income growth for 44 African economies. Data on GDP per capita at 2000 international PPP prices are taken from the all sub-Saharan African countries for which PPP GDP data exist. There are no GDP per capita PPP data for Liberia, San Tomé and Principe, and Somalia, and they are excluded from the analysis. 4 The un-weighted mean GDP per capita between 1975 and 2005 for the 44 countries in our sample was $2,306. Mean GDP per capita using GDP weighted data was $1,702. 5 Table A1 in the appendix presents descriptive statistics for income and growth at the country level. 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Growth Trend Cycle
Figure 1a: Unweighed data 3 !975 is the first year available for this indicator. 4 We, thus, have a panel of data with 44 countries and 31 periods. Our sample accounted for 98.4 percent of population and 99 percent of regional GDP in 2005. Although Equatorial Guinea is in our sample, we removed the country from charts, econometrics, and aggregate descriptive statistics because its extremely high growth rates in recent years distort many of the results. 5 Although there are differences between GDP per capita at PPP and non-PPP, those differences are confined to levels and do not affect growth trajectories. PPP and non-PPP growth data share similar statistical properties. See Arbache and Page (2008) for a fuller discussion. 6 We employ the Hodrick-Prescott filter in Figure 1 to smooth the estimate of the long term trend component of the GDP growth series. 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Growth Trend Cycle Both the un-weighted and weighted series show a positive trend beginning in the mid-1990s. In the period 1995-2005, un-weighted average GDP growth per capita was 1.81 percent, more than twice the long-term average. In order to test for statistically meaningful breaks in mid-1990s, we ran recursive residual estimations and other stability tests. Figure 2 shows the recursive estimation for the growth series. There is statistical evidence that growth accelerated around 1995. Both the Chow breakpoint and forecast tests support the conclusion that a structural break in the income growth series occurred in mid-1990s. 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 Recursive Residuals ± 2 S.E. 7 We also find evidence of a structural break in the per capita income series at about the same time.
Growth rates for individual countries were low, and the coefficient of variation was high, indicating that growth was highly erratic ( Table 2 decomposes the standard deviation of GDP per capita and its growth into within and between country components. Growth is highly unstable in individual countries; the ratio of the within-country SD to the total SD of growth rates is 94 percent.
The Comoros (-22.6), Ethiopia (18.4), Guinea-Bissau (-11.9), Malawi (24.6), Mauritania (34.6), Namibia (19.8), Nigeria (18.7), and South Africa (20.6) are notable for their extremely high volatility, even by regional standards.
Only three economies -Botswana (0.5), Cape Verde (0.8), and Mauritius (0.4) - Kernel densities of the distribution of per capita GDP growth rates at ten year intervals are shown in figure 4 . The growth acceleration of 1995-2005 is clearly visible in the rightward shift of the distribution. The most striking change in the distribution over time, however, is the extent to which growth rates have converged (figure 4a). The 1976 distribution is remarkably flat.
Since then, there have been increasingly more acute peaks around the mean (figures 4b -4d). The SD of growth rates dropped from 8.2 percent in 1976 to 3.6 percent in 2005. 8 Equatorial Guinea, which ranks first, and Lesotho, which ranks fifth, have the same coefficient of variation of growth of about 1.7. Two sets of outliers -high performers and economies in decline -also appear to be emerging in the 1995 and 2005 distributions (figures 4c and 4d ).
An important question with respect to long-term growth is whether it has been persistent. Figure 5 shows the results of regressing average GDP per capita growth on growth in the first year of our series, 1975-1976 : We also stratified the data before and after 1995 to assess whether there was evidence of persistence during either of the two sub-periods: 9 Gabon grew 31 percent in 1976, biasing the results. So, we removed it from the regression. The results are shown in figures 6a and 6b. The coefficients of β are 0.06 (1.38) and 0.21 (3.06), respectively, for the first and second periods, suggesting that growth became more predictable from the mid-1990s on, a result that is in line with the kernel density exercises. As an additional check for persistence at the individual country level we calculated the correlation coefficients of growth over time for individual countries.
Statistically significant coefficients indicate that country growth rates follow predictable patterns. The very large majority of correlation coefficients before 1995 are not statistically significant, but about a third of the coefficients of 1995-2005 are significant (Arbache and Page, 2008) . This suggests that at the individual country level growth was generally erratic, although there was increased persistence between 1995 and 2005.
11 10 We removed Rwanda from regression and figure 6b because it grew 37.5 percent in 1995 distorting the results. 11 Easterly et al. (1993) found for a worldwide sample that correlation of growth across decades is also very low, averaging 0.3. In sum for the region as a whole, and for the vast majority of African economies, growth from 1975 to 2005 has been both disappointing and volatile. Growth on average has accelerated and has shown a weak tendency to become more persistent over time, but for the individual African country, past growth helps very little to predict future growth.
Rich Country, Poor Country
Africa's mean GDP per capita had a slowly rising long-term trend, consisting of about 20 years of virtual stagnation with an inflexion point upward in the mid 1990s 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 GDP per capita Trend Cycle Figure 7a : Unweighted data 12 We employ the Hodrick-Prescott filter in Figure 7 . 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 G DP per capita Trend Cycle The second peak virtually disappears in each ten year period when we remove Botswana, Cape Verde, Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, the Seychelles, and South Africa from the data. Thus these seven countries form a stable, rich country club. 13 With the exception of South Africa the members of the club are small economies, and they have relatively little in common with one another. Botswana, Cape Verde and Mauritius had high growth -even by global standards -and low growth volatility. The Seychelles had more moderate growth with high volatility. Namibia and South Africa hardly grew but were highly erratic growers, and Gabon declined with high volatility. Cape Verde
Mauritius and the Seychelles are islands. Botswana is landlocked and resource rich. income. An important "neighborhood effect" is apparent in the data. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, all to a large degree integrated into the South African economy, are among the faster converging economies. Twenty three countries experienced little or no change in their income levels relative to South Africa, and 11 -including Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe -had sharp deteriorations. The increase in income divergence was particularly sharp in Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Gabon. It is interesting to note that a majority of resource-rich countries (including oil exporters) did not improve their relative positions (Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and Zambia), providing support to the arguments of Collier (2007) and others that the "natural resource curse" is particularly relevant in Africa.
A more formal test of whether the income per capita of poorer African countries is converging toward the regions' richer ones can be conducted using the following unconditional convergence model: (4) negative.
. The regression -shown graphically in figure 9 -offers no evidence of unconditional convergence. The estimated coefficient is not significantly different from zero ( β = -0.122, t = -0.29), indicating that in Africa the initial level of income alone has no effect on the growth rate.
14 These results confirm our heuristic evidence of substantial inertia in the income distribution and are consistent with other research. McCoskey 
Where You Start Is Where You End Up
The previous sections identified some stylized facts about long-term GDP per capita growth and the distribution of income at the country level in Africa. These stylized facts -low and volatile growth, the formation of clubs, lack of convergence in income levels, and rising inter country income inequality -point toward little dynamism in income growth. In this section, we examine the income dynamics of countries in greater detail.
We begin by asking the question: how stable is the per capita income of a typical country in Africa? To test for income stability we run the following regression:
where i Y is the mean GDP per capita of country i, and is the GDP per capita of country i in 1975. Given our prior evidence of little income dynamism, we expect that average income in a typical African economy will be close to its initial income in 1975.
If so, the coefficient estimate of β should be close to 1. A region with a large number of dynamic economies would have an estimated coefficient of significantly more than 1, indicating that initial income under predicts average income. 16 For countries for which GDP data was not available in 1975 we used the earliest available year. 
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To check whether there was a change in income stability accompanying the growth acceleration after 1995 we ran the same stability tests for average GDP per capita for the sub periods 1975-1994 and 1995-2005 by regressing average income in those periods on the initial level of income in 1975. The results are highly significant and close to 1 (estimated coefficients of 0.891 and 0.909, respectively). These are virtually identical to the results of equation 5, implying that the income structure remained highly stable, even after the break in the income and growth series in around 1995. 17 We also calculated the year to year correlation coefficients of GDP per capita within countries over time.
Most coefficients are large and significant, thus supporting the finding of significant inertia in income levels. 18 We also ran the same model while controlling for growth SD, and the results were virtually the same.
Hunting for Leopards
Our results to this point are somewhat discouraging from the perspective of identifying a major turn-around in Africa's economic fortunes. It is possible, however, that within this stable overall structure individual countries stand out by exhibiting more dynamic behavior. These "leopards" -Africa's equivalent of Asia's "tigers" -might be expected to have made the transition, common to China, Korea, Malaysia, and other newly industrializing Asian economies, from low income to higher income status. Korea for example began its rapid growth period at levels of income well below that of the average Asian economy (and equal to that of Ghana) and finished at levels well above.
In an attempt to identify dynamic economies we constructed a typology based on income levels. We split the time-series into two sub periods, 1975-94 and 1995-2005 .
For each year, we calculated Sub-Saharan Africa's median GDP per capita and then checked whether each country's GDP per capita was above or below the median. A country whose GDP per capita remained above the median for the majority of years in 1975-94 was assigned to category "A," meaning that its GDP per capita was generally "above" the benchmark. A country whose GDP per capita remained below the median for most years was assigned category "B," meaning "below". Bosworth and Collins (2003) had a similar method for grouping countries. They grouped 84 countries from all regions as higher income and lower income, according to the per capita income above or below the median. However, they took the income per capita in 1960, their first year, as reference for grouping. Garner (2006) used average long-term growth rates to classify African countries. We also tested other criteria for grouping countries, using means instead of medians, growth instead of GDP per capita level, and clustering analysis, among others; but the present exercise provided the most robust results. We ran the median exercise removing South Africa, but the classification of countries remained basically the same. 20 Table A2 in the annex shows the countries' GDP per capita and median by year and respective assignments to country groups.
• AA -Countries with GDP per capita above Africa's median GDP per capita for most years of the first and second periods; • BB -Countries with GDP per capita below Africa's median GDP per capita for most years of the first and second periods;
• BA -Countries with GDP per capita that switches from below to above Africa's median GDP per capita from the first to the second period; • AB -Countries with GDP per capita that switches from above to below Africa's median GDP per capita from the first to the second period.
The results of this classification exercise are presented in Table 4 . Figure 12 shows the GDP per capita by country group over time. Basic statistics on the country groups are presented in Table A3 in the appendix. 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 21 To test the robustness of the country group classification we estimated pooled and fixed-effect regression models. Country group coefficients for income levels are statistically significant at the 5 percent level; they are sizable and have the expected signs. These results suggest that the country group classifications are relevant and highly stable in predicting income levels (Arbache and Page, 2008 Given the diversity of growth experiences within our stable lower and higher income groups, it is possible our leopards are emerging within rather than between the groups. To continue our search for growth leaders we use a variation of the methodology developed by Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) to identify growth accelerations (good times) and decelerations (bad times). Our approach (Arbache and Page, 2007) differs from theirs and that of researchers applying their method to Africa (IMF, 2007) in two important respects. First, it identifies both growth accelerations and decelerations in a cross-section of countries. Second, it does not use a common threshold growth rate to identify growth accelerations. Instead, it defines good and bad times relative to each country's long run economic performance. In Africa's volatile, low growth environment this seems appropriate.
Four conditions define good times for a given country:
• First, the four-year forward-moving average of GDP per capita growth minus the four-year backward-moving average is greater than zero for a given year.
• Second, the four-year forward-moving average of growth is above the country's long-run trend.
• Third, the four-year forward-moving average of GDP per capita exceeds the four-year backward-moving average.
• Fourth, the first three conditions are satisfied for at least three years in a row, followed by the three subsequent years after the last year that satisfies the first three conditions.
Growth decelerations -bad times -are defined by the opposites of the first three conditions for good times, and the presence of the fourth. The remaining country-year observations reflect normal economic times with countries growing at about their trend growth rate. Countries that experienced growth accelerations managed to grow on average by 3.6 percent per year during those episodes, compared with the region-wide average of 0.7 percent. During decelerations, countries contracted on average by -2.7 percent. Consistent with the region's long run growth trend, the period 1995-2005 saw a substantial increase in the frequency of growth accelerations and a corresponding reduction in growth declines compared to the previous 20 years. 22 As a means of checking the robustness of the results, growth accelerations and decelerations were also identified by replacing 0 with +1 percent and −1 percent for acceleration and deceleration, respectively, in condition 1, but the results did not change substantially. Therefore, only the base-case results are reported, because they are less restrictive Burundi, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, and Swaziland in contrast had a reduction in the frequency of growth accelerations relative to earlier periods. Table   7 presents information on growth rates by country on average and during acceleration episodes for the relevant time periods. The last two columns show the deviation of the growth rate during accelerations from trend . 23 We could attempt to use the increase in the relative frequency of growth accelerations as a criterion for identifying potential leopards. Using that criterion alone would lead us toward picking such dramatically improved performers as Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Sudan and Tanzania, for example. It would, however, also lead us to exclude such historically strong economies as Botswana, Lesotho and Mauritius. This is partly an artifact of our method of identifying growth accelerations. Because we define an acceleration (or deceleration) relative to an economy's own long run trend growth rate, a sustained small improvement from a low long run trend, while clearly beneficial, would not qualify for leopard status.
Rather, we identify potential leopards as those countries that had both sustained long term growth and a high frequency of growth accelerations using the following four criteria:
• .40 E r i t r e a 1 . 9 6 1 7 . 2 4 -0 . 8 2 n a n a n a n a n a Ethiopia 0. Have we found the leopards in these six economies? In light of the income dynamics described in sections 1-4 we should be cautious before declaring the hunt over.
Perhaps the most worrying feature of our set of high performers is the presence of five resource rich economies among the eight. One of these, Botswana, is a perennial growth leader, not just in Africa but globally. It certainly has much to offer to other resource rich countries in Africa in terms of lessons of 30 years of experience in transforming natural resource wealth into economic growth. But, given the history of resource abundant economies in Africa -and the negative income dynamics we found for several mineral dependent economies -we are somewhat reluctant to identify the other resource rich economies in the sample as long term growth leaders. Elsewhere (Arbache and Page, 2007) we have shown that conflicts are associated with a higher probability of growth declines. It is noteworthy that Angola, Chad and Sudan all have a recent history of conflicts, making the durability of their growth uncertain.
Of the diversified, coastal economies Cape Verde has the longest history of economic success, but it is extremely small (although so too were Hong King and Singapore at one time) and highly dependent on international migrant remittances for much of its income growth. Mozambique and Tanzania, both of which are diverse relatively large economies by African standards, may offer greater prospects of emerging as models for other coastal countries.
We may also have excluded some longer term good performers such as Lesotho, Mauritius, Rwanda and Uganda unfairly, by placing substantial weight on the frequency and pace of recent growth accelerations. Because our definition of growth accelerations is relative to the long run rate of growth of the economy, these long term growers may be victims of their own success; by growing relatively fast achieving further accelerations is made that much more difficult. Alternatively, had we placed even greater weight on growth accelerations, we might have included Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Namibia and Nigeria among the list of countries with increasing growth potential, given the high frequency with which they experienced accelerated growth in 1995-2005.
To sum up, we believe that our hunt for leopards has been a moderate success.
Not surprisingly, many of Africa's potential growth leaders are rich in natural resources.
For them -to the extent that oil and minerals prices remain high -the challenge will be less about maintaining growth than about using resource rents well. Botswana has shown that this is possible, but, given the history of natural resource revenue management in Africa, it may be the only true leopard to emerge from this group. We are somewhat more optimistic about the group of diversified economies. Cape Verde has a long track record of good and accelerating economic growth. Mozambique and Tanzania clearly have shown growth potential. If we add the "near misses" -Lesotho, Mauritius, Rwanda and Uganda -to the list we have a group of economies from which some leopards seem likely to emerge.
Conclusions
This paper has described some long-term features of the growth and distribution of GDP per capita among countries in sub-Saharan African. Our main goal was to identify the long-term patterns and regularities in income dynamics across countries and to search for leopards -economies that stood out with respect to the speed and persistence of their growth. Our main findings are the following:
• Growth has been low and volatile. African countries have erratic growth around a low mean. Growth is extremely volatile across Africa, and this phenomenon is not restricted to economies with any specific economic or geographic attributes.
• Growth has accelerated since the mid 1990s. A structural break in both the per capita income and growth series for the region took place around 1995, when the growth rate accelerated significantly across the continent. More countries experienced more frequent growth accelerations relative to their long term trend, and the distribution of growth rates began to converge.
• There is significant inertia in the distribution of income across countries. Our • Africa's cross-country income distribution is becoming less equal. Africa can be divided into rich and poor income clubs.
Despite recent improvements in growth performance in poor countries, the richest countries have grown more in the long run, and that has increased the income gap. As a consequence, the distribution of incomes among countries in Africa is becoming less equal.
• Initial conditions matter a great deal for income distribution but not for growth. Initial conditions, represented by the economy's 1975 level of income, seem to be the single most important factor explaining income levels.
Whatever the mechanics behind this phenomenon, it exerts a strong and persistent influence on income determination and on the structure of income among countries. We did not find evidence that initial conditions are associated with long-run growth.
• A small number of countries have emerged as possible "leopards", but we remain uncertain as to the durability of their growth. Using a combination of income transitions, growth thresholds, and growth accelerations we identified eight economies as Africa's potential growth leaders. Five of the eight, however, are resource rich economies, which our analysis of growth dynamics suggests may under perform their potential. One of these, Botswana, is a long time high performer. The four other resource-rich economies -Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan -meet our criteria, but we are somewhat reluctant to identify them as leopards. Of the diversified coastal economies Cape Verde has the longest history of economic success, but it is highly dependent on international remittances for much of its income growth.
Mozambique and Tanzania may offer prospects of emerging as models for other African economies.
We began this paper by asking whether the growth turn around in Africa marked a reversal of the nearly three decade decline in Africa's economic fortunes. We found evidence of a statistically significant rise in growth and per capita incomes for the region, but we are left wondering whether the good times will last. While growth on average has accelerated and volatility has declined since 1995, we still find considerable inertia in pretty much determined where it ended up in terms of average income. The rich and poor country clubs were remarkably stable and there were very few transitional cases. The rich were getting a bit richer, but the poor were getting richer more slowly, which led to rising inequality in the country-level distribution of incomes. We identified a small number of high performing economies, but most of these were resource rich. And, while we found some potential leopards among the region's more diversified economies, Africa will need more growth leaders, drawn from a wider variety of geological and geographical circumstances before we can confidently assert it has turned the corner. Notes: t-test does not reject the hypothesis of equality of means of growth rates between AA and BB, but reject the equality of means of GDP per capita.
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